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Universal Human Rights and Democratization 
By Mark Strege 
University of Florida 
Over the course of the past decade, and particularly since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, a much noted wave of democratization has swept over the world. 
From Argentina to Zambia, Bangkok to Bamako, authoritarian regimes have 
been challenged and forced to yield to popular governments legitimized by free 
elections. Considered in conjunction with the demise of the Soviet Union, these 
events have led some observers to speculate that democracy, and specifically its 
classically liberal form, has become the universal political ideal. 
Perhaps the most celebrated example of such theorizing is Francis 
Fukuyama's article entitled, "The End of History." Published in the National 
Interest in 1989, Fukuyama's article created a considerable intellectual stir. 
Informed by the thought of the German philosopher George F. W. Hegel, the 
authorargued thatliberaldemocracy"mayconstitutetheendpointofmankind's 
ideological evolution," and as such, would be the final form of human govern-
ment. History in the Hegelian sense had come to an end, since the ideal, though 
not necessarily the implementation, of liberal democracy could not be im-
proved upon.1 
Fukuyama's article engendered a number of skeptical responses, not the 
least of which was the contention that liberal democracy's appeal was hardly 
universal. Recent events notwithstanding, political scientists such as Elie 
Kedourie have suggested that the values and traditions of many non-Western 
nations are incompatible with the requirements of democracy.2 On the other 
hand, theorists from the developing world, such as Julius Nyerere and Kenneth 
Kaunda, have argued thatauthentic democracies arenotuniversally liberal, but 
instead vary according to the culture in which they exist.3 Both of these 
positions imply that liberal democracy is a distinctly Western construct, whose 
claims to universal validity are undermined by an appreciation of the culturally 
relative nature of political norms and values. 
And yet democracy currently appears to be a cross-cultural standard of 
political legitimacy. As Giovanni Sartori has noted, no nation claims to be anti-
democratic.4 How can we reconcile the claims of cultural relativism seen in the 
work of Kedourie and Nyerere with the outbreak of liberal democratic govern-
ment all over the world? The answer to this question may lie with the increasing 
acceptance worldwide of a universal standard of human rights. 
Fukuyama Revisited 
Fukuyama, however, has a different explanation for the cross-cultural 
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embrace of liberal democracy. In The End of History and the Last Man, he poin~s 
totheriseofthescientificmethodduringtheEnlightenmentandthetechnolog1-
cal revolution which ensued. Technological advances led to new forms of 
economic organization and the eventual ~cendancy o~ a parti~ar ~conomic 
structure: the market, or liberal, economy. The supenor organizational effi-
ciency and technology of liberal economies are now self-evident and univer-
sally appreciated. 
Liberal economies lead to liberal democracies as a result of what Fukuyama 
terms the universal drive for "status recognition." All humans possess a 
longing for recognition, status, or a certain degre~of sod~ distin~~n. ~ukuy~ 
argues that as nations embrace liberal economlcs, the mdustr1aliz.atton wh~ch 
results inevitably produces a more educated and wealthy populace. Increasing 
education and social mobility promote the spread of egalitarian ideas as well as 
a demand for recognition from society and its government. Liberal democracy 
emerges from this process as the best possible political answer to the demands 
for status recognition, equality, and free-market economics. While Fukuyama 
admits that liberal democracy has its flaws, the increasing number of liberal 
democratic states, particularly in the industrialized "first" world, is held to 
constitute the universal recognition that liberal democracy is the most "ratio-
nal" form of human government. 
Fukuyama has in effect built on the work of early scholars in the field of 
development studies, such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Walt Rostow.5 By 
adding a psychological universal, i.e. the drive towards status recognition, 
Fukuyama's theory rests on a presupposition regarding human nature open to 
debate. Even if one accepts this assumption, The End of History does little to help 
us understand why nations such as Paraguay, Benin, and Bangladesh have all 
adopted liberal democratic regimes, three nations whose only commonality 
may be their largely pre-industrial economies. Nor can the author explain why 
an inegalitarian society such as India has managed to guard its "post-historical" 
liberal democratic institutions for the past forty-five years. In passing, one 
might note that given the delicate state of the global environment, the sort of 
Westernized industrialization that Fukuyama envisions on a worldwide basis 
may give "the end of history" a whole new meaning. Reservations with regards 
to Fukuyama' s assessment of the triumph of liberal democracy are not without 
reason. 
An Alternative Tact 
While Fukuyama's theory may or may not give insight into recent political 
changes in relatively developed nations such as South Korea or Chile, the rise 
of liberal democratic regimes in many of the world's less advanced countries 
can be more accurately explained by a different dynamic. Many of these 
democratic revolutions appear to be driven as much by a popular desire to 
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empower governments which respect basic international standards of human 
rights than by the arrival at a particular stage of economic development. This 
observation is especially relevant in Africa, where a score of nations have 
undergone unprecedented liberalization and/ or democratization during the 
past five years. As Bratton and Van De Walle have observed, these changes have 
occurred despite stagnant, if not deteriorating, economic performances by 
I. states across much of the continent for over two decades.6 While obviously 
hopeful that new regimes would facilitate economic development, the popular 
movements which sprung up to challenge the authoritarian status quo were 
often united primarily by their opposition to political oppression and corrup-
i tion.7 Their goals were the establishment of democratic polities which re-
spected basic human rights and provided for a degree of political accountabil-
ity, regardless of their economic policy. This suggests that the impact of 
political variables, and particularly the development of the concept of human 
rights, ought to be examined by political scientists as a prime component of the 
recent wave of democratization, as opposed to solely economic and presumed 
psychological factors. 
However, human rights are a concept as subject to the critiques of cultural 
relativists as is liberal democracy. There would seem to be a legion of differing 
formulations and interpretations stating exactly which rights constitute basic 
human rights. But as Jack Donnelly points out in his book, Universal Human 
Rights In Theory and Practice, the standards of human rights enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the U.N. General Assem-
bly in 1948) and the International Human Rights Covenants (which came into 
force in 1976) are recognized by nations around the world, in word if not in 
deed. The cross-cultural consensus these standards, known collectively as the 
International Bill of Human Rights, reflect is taken to represent certain univer-
sal political ideals. These ideals are considered universal owing to the degree 
of cross-cultural consensus regarding the indignities and injustices against 
which every individual has the right to be protected by virtue of being human. 
For example, Articles 3 and 22 of the Universal Declaration protect the right to 
life and food respectively, while Articles 4 and 5 protect against slavery, torture, 
and other inhuman or degrading treatment. Donnelly argues that the wide-
spread acceptance of the Universal Declaration and the Covenants can be 
explained by the fact that this list "responds to the major perceived threats to 
human dignity" in the world today. Since any particular formulation of human 
rights is a list of the principal threats to human dignity in a given era, Donnelly 
expects that human rights standards will continue to evolve and expand in 
response to changing ideas of human dignity, as well as the rise of new threats 
to these ideas. He goes on to argue that the universal recognition of human 
rights renders legitimate only those sorts of political regimes which insure their 
respect.8 
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Donnelly's approach is not without its critics. Adamantia Pollis and Peter 
Schwab argue in their book, Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, 
that there is no universal concurrence on the meaning of human rights. Rather, 
the standards of human rights represented by the International Bill of Human 
Rights are a particularly Western interpretation of the concept, grounded in a 
cultural heritage of individualism alien to much of the non-Western world. 
From this perspective, any attempt to justify a given political system by virtue 
of its respect for human rights would be culturally biased. For human rights do 
not substantiate any universal political ideals, concepts or aspirations.~ 
Pollis and Schwab also state that concepts of human dignity are so 
culturally subjective that little more than vague generalities can be made about 
cross-cultural similarities. Political norms and values vary from society to 
society, and the outside observer is in no position to pass judgement on the 
standards of an alien culture. Any universal list of human rights is then suspect, 
as in all likelihood such a list reflects a particular, subjective conception of 
political, social, or economic threats to a dignified life. While the human rights 
ideals which the West commonly accepts may more or less perfectly represent 
Western standards of human dignity, other conceptions of human dignity and 
human rights are just as valid. 
A Critique of Cultural Relativism 
At first glance, such arguments appear convincing to any reader who 
appreciates the culturally relative nature of norms and values. However, the 
ramifications of such a line of thought are unsettling. If we accept Pollis's and 
Schwab's position, do we really have no response to a Pol Pot who claims his 
regime reflects authentic Cambodian values? Can we not condemn a cannibal-
istic Jean Bed el Bokassa for firing upon school children? Are we forced to accept 
ldi Amin's attempts at genocide were he to tell us that's just the way things are 
done in Uganda? Have we no right to impose our biases, our standards of 
human dignity and human rights, on an Islamic regime in Sudan brutally 
imposing shari' a law on a Christian and Animist minority? 
In short, without universal standards of political morals and political 
norms, have we no choice but to embrace behavior we find despicable, ac-
knowledge actions we abhor, and tum a blind eye to conduct that seems 
indefensible? Of course, this is not how cultural relativists choose to pose the 
question . Instead, since all societies do appear to have concepts of human 
dignity and injustice, one can hold regimes responsible to the standards of the 
societies in which they exist. Presumably, that would allow us to condemn the 
Idi Amins and Pol Pots according to the political norms of their own cultures. 
However, cultural norms and values are not static. They change along with 
the opinions and behavior of the indiV!duals who constitute the society in 
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question. As Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im points out, "Society is never an 
entity separable from the individuals who compose it." He goes on to note that, 
"No civilization has in it any element which in the last analysis is not the 
contribution of an individual. Where else could any trait come from except 
from the behavior of a man or a woman or a child?"10 Thus, cultures do not have 
an independent existence. Rather, they exist in flux, as the evolving mental 
constructs, world views, and behavioral norms of a given society. While many 
aspects of a given culture are consistently passed down from generation to 
generation, all cultures continually incorporate the ideas, habits, and values 
among its contemporary members. As an example, one may examine the 
history of colonialism in Great Britain. In 1905, the majority of English 
considered colonialism in the non-Western world perfectly acceptable, so much 
so that it was taken for granted by British subjects. But by 1945, the colonial ideal 
was becoming increasingly disputed with.in the United Kingdom, and by 1985, 
it was no longer seriously entertained. British cultural attitudes changed as a 
result of an evolution in the views of individual English subjects. 
Once one recognizes that cultures are not static, any attempt to hold 
regimes who violate a given human rights standard accountable to their own 
cultural norms becomes problematic. If Mao's Great Leap Forward could be 
said to respect and reflect the changed, Revolutionary morality of hundreds of 
millions of Chinese, attempts to apply pre-Communist cultural norms would 
be out of place.11 Claims of a similar nature might invariably be made by the Pol 
Pots and Hitlers who plague our world. Those wishing to depend on differing 
cultural concepts of human dignity can give no moral rejoinder to the assertion, 
"that's just the way we do things around here now," without first undertaking 
extensive empirical research in an attempt to refute it. 
Though dearly an impractical task, rationalizations by such tyrants could 
indeed be empirically tested. But what if large numbers of individuals in a 
given society actually engage in conduct universally condemned by outsiders? 
If, by chance, a majority of Hindus are willing to coerce widows into committing 
suttee, the culturally subjective position would be to condone such practices. If 
a large percentage of Serbs believe actions aimed at "ethnic cleansing" are 
morally acceptable, the relativist has no ground on which to condemn them. If 
a theocratic Iranian government wishes to place a bounty on the head of a writer 
who has insulted Islam, the Ayatollahs may well be acting in a In.armer 
consistent with contemporary Persian conceptions of justice. Once we recog-
nize that cultural norms exist only in the minds of the individuals who share 
that culture, the implications for the culturally subjective position on human 
rights are considerable. For it would seem to mean that any formulations held 
by a majority of a given society must be considered valid, morally defensible 
constructs of human dignity. If such a society engages in conduct consistent 
with these constructs but which violates the human rights stand.ards of outsid-
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ers, we might disagree but not condemn. 
In order to escape this dilemma, one could of course simply choose to act 
on the basis of one's subjective standards of human rights. The Westerner could 
simply state, ''This is my conception of human dignity and I am perfectly happy 
upholding certain human rights as a defense against threats to this view." Then, 
in concert with others, one could attempt to impose those subjective personal 
beliefs about human rights on a universal basis. How far such an approach will 
get us in today's world is open to question. The attempts to imppse ahuman 
rights regime consciously based on any one particular understanding of human 
dignity smacks of cultural imperialism. Indeed, it may be counterproductive. 
A prime factor contributing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in much of the 
Muslim world would appear to be perceptions of just that sort of cultural 
imperialism by the West.12 The fundamentalist movement expresses a frustra-
tion born of the belief that the West is trying to impose its political norms, ideas, 
and values on these societies. Thus, the aggressive pursuit of alien concepts of 
human dignity and human rights by outsiders may often lead to a destructive 
backlash of opinion within the society in question. Perhaps the most troubling 
aspect of such a position is that it suggests that those wishing to hold us to their 
understandings of human dignity are also justified in seeking to impose their 
standards upon us. A Hobbesian battle of all against all amongst competing 
human rights regimes is hardly conducive to diminishing threats to human 
dignity universally. 
An Emerging Universal Human Rights Standard 
The dilemma posed by an appreciation of cultural subjectivity for those 
wishing to act on a standard of human rights appears unresolvable. However, 
as history unfolds this dilemma is becoming less and less important. For it 
appears that a cross-cultural convergence is occurring with regard to interna-
tional standards of human rights. This emerging human rights standard is an 
important contributing factor to the recent wave of democratization world-
wide, and its influence is particularly profound in many African cases. 
How can any particular conception of human rights possibly be represen-
tative of political norms cross-culturally? The realization that cultural concep-
tions of human rights are in fact the aggregate of the views of individuals 
sharing that culture opens up a new line of inquiry. The possibility of a middle 
ground between the claims of cultural relativists and cultural imperialists may 
exist regarding human rights regimes. When individuals in a society collec-
tively change their individual ideas, habits, and values, the standards of their 
culture change as well. According to Inglehart, cultural change occurs as an 
adaptive response to economic, technological, and political shifts.13 In fact, as 
Wildavskynotes, cultural change and cultural stability are essentially two sides 
of the same coin, since individuals in a given culture are continually confronting 
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novel situations requiring great effort to maintain familiar patterns of social 
relations and inhibit change.14 Cultural change and stability occur only then 
within the context of social relations and social adaptation. In the realm of 
human rights, new understandings of human dignity have emerged on a global 
basis which are substantiated by new formulations of human rights, concep-
tions which operate as a mechanism of social adaptation in response to the 
historical legacy of the 20th century. As a result of developments which will 
shortly be addressed in more detail, what appears to be occurring in much of 
the world today is a continuous, if largely imperceptible, process of culture 
change. This dynamic has resulted in considerable convergence of cultural 
ideals of both human dignity and human rights, which in turn has led to the 
success of political movements promoting these ideals. 
This suggests that a culturally authentic universal standard of human 
rights is emerging. It is a process which is dialectical and subject to change, but 
nonetheless, it represents a trend towards a global conjunction of minimal 
standards of human dignity. Obviously, its manifestation is more apparent in 
Bamako and Seoul than in Belgrade and Teheran. It must also be noted that such 
change is more apparent among those who are educated and residing in urban 
areas, which may reflect a certain class bias. Such observations demonstrate the 
continuing political importance of economic, psychological, social, and histori-
cal factors. In this regard, all one can say is that some cultures appear more 
amenable to rapid changes of this sort than others. Nevertheless, this trend has 
resulted in the increasing acceptance of a cross-cultural understanding of 
human rights significantly influenced by Western Europe. 
Donnelly suggests that "human rights represent a distinctive set of social 
practices tied to particular notions of human dignity that initially arose in the 
modem West in response to the social changes produced by modem states and 
modem capitalist market economies. "15 The spread of similar changes to other 
partsof theworld facilitated their adoption universally. However,a globalization 
of conceptions of human dignity appears to be manifest even in societies with 
weak, ineffectual governments and pre-modem economies. Thus, these devel-
opments are not simply a result of industrialization or political development. 
A more important factor is the discernible change in the mental constructs, 
world views, and behavioral norms of large numbers of individuals from a 
multitude of different cultures. Individual Africans, Asians, and Americans 
have internalized the concept of rights as a response to threats against their 
understandings of personal human dignity. While many of these societies may 
have traditionally had concepts of collective or group rights shared by the 
individuals of the given group, as well as refined conceptions of human dignity, 
the idea of rights against the state for the individual qua individual appears to 
have been introduced to these societies by the West. Once these new formula-
tions of standards of human dignity have been adopted by a large enough 
I 
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number of individuals in a given society, reformed understandings of human 
dignity and human rights become authentic standar~s of that cu~ture. ~ere­
fore, the claims of cultural relativists that Western-influenced international 
standards of human rights are ethnocentric impositions prove to be unfounded 
if such standards have become elements of cultures across the globe. In the 
African context, it may well be that a substantial majority of rural producers 
hardly possess the sort of ~efined un~ersra:1ding of 
1
human .rights ~~ap~ulated 
by the Universal Declaration. That said, this author s experiences li~mg m rural 
West Africa suggest that the political understanding and consciousness of 
African peasants is often much more sophisticated than those in the West tend 
to assume. 
Colonialism and Communism 
The question then becomes one of whether evidence exists that the 
globalization of standards of human dignity is in fact occurring, and if so, why? 
While talk of an emerging" global village" is a common, if dated, idea congruent 
to this conception, a more empirical approach to the question is needed. Th.e 
fact that governments representing nations with very different cultural tradi-
tions have recognized the International Bill of Human Rights suggests that 
there is evidence for the first contention. Examining how the globalization of 
human dignity constructs has happened in greater depth will in turn provide 
a fuller justification. 
The spread of Western conceptions of human dignity and human rights is 
a result of the development of two very different influences, though both with 
origins in the West. As European nations colonized most of Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia, individuals from Western andnon-W estern cultures began an 
era of sustained interaction. Colonialism introduced individuals from both 
Europe and the rest of the world to differing social artifacts, goods, technical 
processes, ideas, habits, and values. Paradoxically, the spread of Communist 
ideologies may also have contributed to the globalization of human rights 
ideals. Despite the fact that Communist doctrines have no place for individual 
rights as claims against society, its conception of oppression is a powerful idea 
fueling the expansion of concepts of human dignity. When coupled with the 
idea of rights as a protection against threats to a dignified life, the concepts of 
oppression which Communism introduced were an important contribution to 
the evolution of standards of human dignity throughout the world. Colonial-
ism itself contributed to the spread of radical ideologies, as the arrogance, 
inequality, and hypocrisy of colonial rule amplified the appeal of Communist 
critiques. Attempts by colonialists to inculcate indigenous peoples with 
inferior self-conceptions were in part thus belied. Instead, as various individu-
als in different non-Western societies experienced prolonged contact with 
Western ideals, their personal conceptions of human dignity were naturally 
influenced by a process of acculturation. Eventually, an appreciation of new 
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human rights constructs developed, too. 
This is not to suggest that such cultures can now be identified as "Wes tern." 
Nor does it imply that the impact of colonialism and Communism were uni-
directional, or that the West was not influenced by its colonial experience. What 
is being argued is that Western culture has become to some degree globalized. 
Those individuals swayed by the ideals which Communism and colonialism 
upheld wed new conceptions of human dignity to their own indigenous 
understandings. Even if the vast majority of individuals in a partic~ar culture 
did not come into direct contact with Western ideals, new concepts filtered back 
to them through those members of their society who had. Thus, while exact 
understandings of human dignity and human rights may differ significantly 
across cultures, most all have been influenced in an important manner by 
Western constructs. For example, Articles 8 through 12 of the Universal 
Declaration provide legal rights against the state, such as due process and 
protection from arbitrary arrest.16 Such understandings may well be in the 
process of becoming almost universally accepted, though great cultural lati-
tude exists among the various social institutions and legal systems upholding 
this right. 
In fact, given the revolutionary impact of Western technologies on pre-
industrialized societies in the developing world, it would be more surprising if 
individuals in these nations remained unaffected by the West. The Western 
cultural legacy was reinforced by the arbitrary manner in which colonial 
cartographers jumbled traditional political boundaries while delimiting the 
territories which were eventually granted independence as sovereign nations. 
These new states, created by Western colonialism, are likely to justify their 
political existence to one degree or another by Western political norms. The 
claims to legitimate authority made by the elites of these states could only be 
partially based on traditional norms. Thus colonialism and Communism 
initiated a process by which W estem world views were introduced to societies 
all over the globe. 
Let us return to the question of whether evidence exists to support the 
contention that a convergence of conceptions of human dignity is occurring. In 
addition to the recognition of the International Bill of Human Rights by nations 
around the world, other developments support the assertion of an emerging 
cross-cultural understanding of human dignity. One of the first ideals to take 
on such a universal appeal is the principle of self-determination. The global 
acceptance of this right was one of the prime factors leading to decolonization 
after World War II. There is little suggest that this ideal is more than a few 
hundred years old in the West, and the same would appear to be true for much 
of Africa and Asia. The widespread embrace of this principle by peoples as 
diverse as the Vietnamese, Indians, Arabs, and numerous African and Carib-
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bean societies implies that it has evolved into a cross-cultural political ideal. A 
look at the experiences and impact of individuals such as Ho Chi Minh, 
Mohandas Gandhi, and Kwame Nkrumah, who led the drive towards self-
determination and decolonization in the Third World, demonstrates the influ-
ence of Western thought on the first cross-cultural understandings of human 
dignity and political rights. 
Some Brief Case Studies 
As with all cultural developments, the spread of new political. ideals, 
habits, and values take time to manifest themselves in political institutions. 
Only when the number of individuals operating on the basis of new political 
ideals reaches a level akin to a " critical mass" will significant change take place. 
It is now, a generation after the end of colonialism, and with the failure of 
Marxist-Leninism readily apparent, that the degree of cross-cultural consensus 
regarding human rights standards has made itself evident. The importance of 
this consensus can be seen in the insistent calls for democratization in nations 
all over the world, but its impact may be gr.eatest in Africa. This seems 
particularly true in the Francophone states, where many previously authoritar-
ian regimes have been forced to liberalize or abdicate. The driving force behind 
these changes was a refusal oflarge numbersofNigeriens, Congolese, Togolese, 
Cameroonians, and Gabonese, among others, to accept continued oppressive 
rule by leaders willing to violate international standards of human dignity and 
new understandings of basic political rights. 
The examples of the Beninois and Malian revolutions serve to illuminate 
this point. Until 1989, Mathieu Kerekou appeared firmly in control of politics 
in Benin, where a one-party state with Marxist-Leninist pretensions buttressed 
the power of this military strongman. In December of that year, the seventeen-
year old regime was rocked by street protests after the police opened fire on 
striking students and teachers.17 What had begun as the latest in a series of 
salary demands escalated into a political crisis of historic proportions. As 
Africans from throughout the region followed the unfolding events in Benin 
with acute interest, Kerekou was forced to concede sovereignty to a hastily 
organized constitutional convention. Nicephore Soglo was chosen as Benin's 
Prime Minister in a transitional government, and Kerekou was stripped of his 
power .18 Free elections were called which confirmed Soglo' s position as Benin's 
new leader. This process, in which popular demonstrations against a repres-
sive regime eventually resulted in democratization, set a precedent closely 
noted by opposition groups throughout the continent. Though economic 
frustrations were an important element fueling discontent, both those nations 
among Africa's least developed and those that were relatively affluent experi-
enced political crises, as the cases of poverty-stricken Niger and oil-rich Gabon 
demonstrate. Thus, economic considerations, though significant, cannot ex-
plain these revolutionary changes. Instead, the galvanizing factor in all of these 
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countries was a popular demand that democratic, accountable governments 
which respected norms of human dignity be established. 
The Malian case is, if anything, an even clearer example of this phenomena. 
The regime of General Moussa Traore, in power since a 1968 coup d'etat, had 
periodically brutally repressed liberalization movements over the course of its 
twenty-two year rule. However, encouraged by the events in Benin, neighbor-
ing Coted 'lvoire, and elsewhere in Africa, as well as a nascent free press, several 
opposition movements sprang up to challenge the Traore regime in early 1991. 
Large street demonstrations took place in the capital, Bamako, in late March, 
and the Army was called out to quell the disturbances. After a bloody 
showdown in the streets, a reformist military clique led by Lt. Col. Amadou 
Toumani Toure seized power and arrested Traore. The new regime quickly 
promised to step down after new elections and organized a national convention 
to draw up a democratic constitution.18 Within a year, a civilian politician, 
Alpha Oumar Konare, had been elected President of Mali's new Third Repub-
lic. The key to this political transition? A popular revulsion with authoritarian 
rule and a widespread desire amongst the politically informed in Mali to 
implement a regime respecting political and civil rights. 
Black Africa is not the only region of the world where new understandings 
of standards of human dignity have had major political ramifications. Even in 
the Arab world, where Islamic fundamentalism has reinforced traditional 
political norms and values, change can be seen. An excellent example of this is 
Algeria, currently undergoing an intense struggle between fundamentalists 
and a modernizing governing elite. After the former ruling party, the National 
Liberation Front (FLN), turned to democratization as a method of diffusing 
general political discontent, Islamic fundamentalism emerged as the most 
powerful opposition movement in Algerian society. Government calculations 
that the fundamentalists, organized around the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 
could be controlled through elections proved misguided when in December, 
1991, the FIS came within a hair's breath of achieving a majority in the first 
round of parliamentary elections. Rather than concede power to a party 
labeling democracy ''blasphemy" and promising to institute Islamic law, the 
Algerian militaiy seized power. They terminated the electoral process and 
cracked down on fundamentalist militants. The near-victory of Algerian 
fundamentalists might seem to call into question the thesis of this paper 
regarding the spread of Western political ideals. Certainly, Algeria is no Benin 
or Mali. What is particularly interesting from the perspective of the argument 
presented in this paper is the reaction to these events among those Algerians 
opposed to the fundamentalists. Surprisingly, the Army received widespread 
support from trade unions, intellectuals, and women's groups. Significant 
elements of Algerian society opposed a return to the political norms and 
standards of fundamentalist Islam which the FIS promised, despite an Islamic 
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cultural legacy as profound as any in the region. Many of those most insistent 
in their calls for democratization were willing to accept an interlude of military 
rule so as to insure that their conceptions of human dignity were not violated 
in the name of Islamic fundamentalism.20 While democratization may have 
been nipped at the bud, the importance placed on the respect for human rights 
displayed by many Algerians suggests that it may find fertile soil in the future. 
Liberalism vs. Liberal Democracy 
The globalization of human rights standards can be seen in protests for 
democracy all over the world. Recent work by Theodore Draper suggests that 
the role played by the human rights organization Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia's 
''Velvet Revolution" is another example of how conceptions of human rights 
and human dignity have been the primary force in recent democratic transi-
tions.21 Similarly, Chinese students in Tianamen Square, democrats protesting 
a military coup in Thailand, and demands by Kenyans for free and fair elections 
all demonstrate the adoption of universalized political values and standards 
around the world. Any number of deposed autocrats and oligarchies can testify 
that continued repression of human rights and democratic institutions are now 
viewed as illegitimate in their nations. 
Why democracy? A non-democratic liberal regime could theoretically be 
just as effective in guaranteeing human rights. But as Giuseppe DiPalma has 
observed, democracy's increasing attraction outside the West is due in large 
part to its "unique virtue as protection against the oppression of arbitrary and 
undivided rule."22 DiPalma terms this the "demonstration effect" as those in 
the developing world observe the ability of liberal democratic nations to curtail 
political oppression. The universalization of political values renders any 
government's legitimacy increasingly dependent on respect for emerging 
standards of human rights. Empirical observation suggests that democracies 
uphold these values better than any other political system. Liberal democratic 
theory is particularly relevant to such concerns with its distinction between the 
public and private spheres. The very concept of human rights implies that all 
political regimes are obliged to accept at least some minimal areas where the 
state cannot tread. One should also note that unlimited majority rule is hardly 
the ideal of the recent democratization movements. While emerging liberal 
democracies in Africa and elsewhere may still be a pale reflection of their 
established Western brethren, both share fundamental concerns regarding the 
prevention of human deprivation and indignities. 
There is an additional explanation of why democracy has been embraced 
around the world. Colonialism and Communism did not only influence 
cultural understandings of human dignity and human rights. While their 
impact in these areas was probably more profound, they also influenced other 
aspects of the political ideals held by individuals in the developing world. The 
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domestic practice of democracy among the principal colonial powers and the 
egalitarian justice Communism preached were attractive notions to elements of 
societies in the Third World. Individuals in these regions incorporated such 
concepts into their world views and political ideals, particularly those who 
were more educated and politically engaged. The members of these developing 
societies who are politically aware and active are often more likely to have 
consciously adopted political views influenced by democratic ideas. They 
associate the respect for human rights with democratic practices and are willing 
to push for both. 
Conclusion 
It is of course true that other factors contributed to the wave of democra-
tization we have seen and are seeing. The end of the Cold War lessened external 
supports for authoritarian regimes allied with either camp. The importance of 
international donor nations and lending agencies cannot be overlooked in the 
African context. But the global convergence in conceptions of human dignity 
and human rights have created new universal standards of political legitimacy. 
These new ideals appear to be a political variable as important as any other 
contributing to the demise of authoritarian regimes around the world. Addi-
tionally, it would appear that the past decade has shown that cultural norms 
and values may be able to evolve in a fundamentally compatible manner. 
While the identification of a cross-cultural norm of human rights influenc-
ing, and sometimes driving, political change in the developing world may be 
a welcomed development in the West, it is hardly cause for celebration. For 
while it appears that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future, though 
certainly with starts and stalls, there is nothing inevitable about cultural 
change. Certainly, the Fukuyama thesis identifying recent moves towards 
democratization with "the end of history" is out of order. It is quite possible that 
Western and non-Western political norms will begin to diverge at some point 
in the future. Thus, theproblemofrelativismandhumanrightsmaybe"passe" 
only in the short run. All that one can say with a degree of confidence is that 
currently a global convergence in conceptions of human dignity is creating a 
universal standard of human rights and that this standard is empowering 
democratization in much of the world. 
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On the "Blessed Assurance" of 
"White Male Ways of Knowing": 
Examining Confessional Discourses on Racism 
By Joel Woller 
Carnegie-Mellon University 
''Interrogate whiteness:" such is the order of the· day. As Henry Giroux 
describes it, the task is to: · 
rewrite the poli?cs .of r~presentation around race and difference by 
deconstructtng m h1stor1cal and relational terms not only the central 
categories of 'Otherness,' but also the dominant discourses and repre-
sentations that secure 'whiteness' as a universalizing norm (9-10). 
The po~tion j~t de~cribed, which Giroux attributes to bell hooks, among 
others, ts of a piece with recent calls for white self-critique-calls which seem 
to be .at l.eas~ partly motivated by a desire to avoid dynamics of political 
org~tlon ~ which tokenized others bear the burden of reforming liberal 
whit~s. ~u~, ma persuasive analysis of the contemporary identity crisis of the 
~ft m Britain, Kobena Mercer proposes a narrative which emphasizes the 
Importance of understanding the politics of identity in relation to questions of 
coalition and alliance. 
The official discourse of anti-racism failed precisely because it im-
posed a one-dimensional view of racial antagonism in practices such 
as 'racism awareness training', which simply reinforced existing 
relations of minority representation. Problems of tokenism-in which 
the one black person on the committee or in the organisation is 
positioned, or rather burdened, with the role of a 'representative' who 
'speaks for' the entire community from which he or she comes-were 
left intact. Black subjects historically marginalised from political 
representation by exclusionary practices reproduced within the Left 
were legitimately angry. But the encoding of such anger often took the 
displaced form of 'guilt tripping' in which potential allies were 
parylsed by the sins of their past. White activists recognised the 
untenable innocence of their conciliatory liberal pluralism, but with-
out a common set of terms in which to share openly criticism and 
disagreements, alliance-building was inhibited by the fear of being 
seen to be 'incorrect' and not 'ideologically right on' (67-8). 
. As far as I know, however, no one has suggested that the proposed and I 
think salutary shift from "racism awareness" to white self-critique is in any 
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